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Abstract
This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage.
We nd that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the rst mover,
although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. We also see the leverage eects of
debt nancing increasing rm values and accelerating investment, even in the presence of
preemptive competition. In addition to the case with optimal capital structure, we analyze
a case with nancing constraints that require rms to nance investment costs by debt.
Notably, nancing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve rm values in
preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to the nancing constraints
can lower the rst-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with
strong rst-mover advantage, the nancing constraint eects can dominate the leverage
eects. These ndings are almost consistent with empirical evidence that high leverage
leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Brander and Lewis (1986), a number of researchers have
investigated the interactions between nancial structure and product market competition.
Although a wide range of competition among levered rms is covered in the existing
literature (e.g., Faure-Grimaud (2000), Povel and Raith (2004)), few papers have analyzed
the eects of leverage on preemptive competition. Analysis of preemptive competition
is increasingly important as rms, such as Apple, lead a new market by technological
innovation and gain great rst-mover advantage all over the world. This paper sheds light
on how nancial structure interacts with preemptive competition.
This paper considers a situation in which two symmetric rms compete for a new
market. When prot ows in a duopoly are lower than those in a monopoly (i.e., negative
externalities), each rm has an incentive to preempt the competitor and gain monopolistic
prot ows before the competitor's entry. In preemptive equilibrium, one of the rms,
denoted by the leader, enters the market earlier than the other, denoted by the follower,
but its rst-mover advantage is oset by its sub-optimally early entry timing. After
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) rst analyzed preemptive equilibrium in a case without
market uncertainty, the literature including Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Grenadier (1996),
and Huisman (2001), has examined cases with market uncertainty.
We examine the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage by extend-
ing the previous analysis to a setup in which rms can access debt nancing on the market
entry. In the levered setup, we consider rms that optimize capital structure based on
the trade-o theory (e.g., Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001)). Through the
model analysis, we nd key results as follows.
First, we nd that the last in, rst out (LIFO) scenario holds in a duopoly. This is
mainly because the leader's entry trigger is much lower than the follower's entry trigger in
preemptive equilibrium. Because of the early entry, the leader's debt issuance is very low
and the follower issues more debt on the later entry timing. Our result is consistent with
MacKay and Phillips (2005) who empirically show that leverage of new entrants is likely
to be higher than that of incumbents. The LIFO scenario is also consistent with empirical
ndings that high debt tends to lead to disadvantage in product market competition (e.g.,
Phillips (1995), Chevalier (1995a), Chevalier (1995b)).
Second, we show that the leverage eects remain unchanged even if one takes account
of preemptive competition. Indeed, compared to the unlevered case, the entry triggers
(rm values) become lower (higher) in preemptive competition with optimal capital struc-
ture. The leverage eects are well known in corporate nance (e.g., Myers (1977)). The
leverage eects are also identied in the investment timing models such as Hennessy
(2004), Mauer and Sarkar (2005), and Sundaresan and Wang (2007a), but they focus on
a monopoly. We ensure the robustness of the leverage eects even in the presence of
preemptive competition.
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In addition to analysis on rms with optimal capital structure, we consider nancially
constrained rms in which investment costs must be nanced by debt issuance. This case
approximates rms that have no cash reserves and cannot use external equity nancing
due to the high costs. Notably, we show that nancing constraints can delay preemptive
investment and improve rm values in equilibrium. The intuition is as follows. The
nancing constraints lead the leader to be highly leveraged, while it increases the value
of the follower's option to wait for the leader's exit. Thus, the constraints reduce rms'
incentive to move rst, and then it alleviates preemptive competition.
The nancing constraint eects can happen with a modest level of rst-mover advan-
tage and greatly increases as the rst-mover advantage is stronger. When the nancing
constraint eects dominate the leverage eects, the preemptive entry trigger can be later
than that of the unlevered case. Although the nancing constraint eects in preemptive
competition have yet to be tested rigorously, there are several ndings related to the
predictions. For instance, empirical evidence indicates that higher leverage can soften
product market competition (e.g., Phillips (1995), Chevalier (1995a), Chevalier (1995b)).
In our paper, higher leverage, which is caused by the nancing constraints, delays the
preemptive entry timing and increases rm values.
Our paper is most closely related to the following papers. Lambrecht (2001) studies the
entry and exit decisions of levered rms in a duopoly. The paper exogenously assumes an
incumbent with debt and examines the follower's entry and nancing decision. Our paper
complements the previous research by extending his model to a new market model in which
two rms compete for rst-mover advantage. Preemptive competition is frequently seen
in technology-oriented industries, for example, information technology (IT) industries.
Our analysis may foster better understanding of such industries. Zhdanov (2008), like
our paper, examines a preemptive competition model with leverage. His model assumes
that the leader survives as an all-equity rm after its default, while, as in Lambrecht
(2001), we simply assume that the leader exits the market. Because of this simplication,
our model is more tractable and easier to analyze. We reveal the eects of rst-mover
advantage and nancing constraints that are not claried by Zhdanov (2008). Nishihara
and Shibata (2010) also study preemption with leverage, but the previous paper assumes
that the follower cannot enter the market until the leader exits it. Because of the polar
assumption, the model applicability is restricted to a situation involving extremely strong
rst-mover advantage. In this paper, we relax the assumption and show how the degree
of rst-mover advantage inuences the results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. As a benchmark, Section 2
introduces the investment policies of unlevered rms in a duopoly. In Section 3, we
illustrate the investment and nancing policies for levered rms in a duopoly. In Section
4, we exercise numerical analysis and provide empirical implications. Section 5 briey
summarizes the paper.
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2 Unlevered rms in a duopoly
2.1 Setup
We use the same setup as the standard literature (e.g., Chapter 9 in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), Chapter 7 in Huisman (2001)). We consider two symmetric rms that have an
opportunity to enter a new market. The entry to the market requires irreversible capital
expenditure I. Throughout this paper, we assume that both rms are risk-neutral and
have full information of each other. When only one of the rms is active in the market,
the active rm receive an instantaneous cash ow X(t) that is inuenced by the market
demand. Following the standard real options literature, we assume that X(t) follows a
geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t) = X(t)dt+ X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x; (1)
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion dened in a probability space (
;F ;P)
and ; (> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. We assume that the initial value is suciently
low to exclude a rm' entry into a market at the initial time. For convergence, we assume
that r > 1, where r is a positive constant interest rate. When both rms are active
in the market, the rst mover, denoted by the leader, receives an instantaneous cash
ow QLX(t) while the second mover, denoted by the follower, receives QFX(t). Assume
that QL and QF are constants satisfying 0 < QF  QL < 1, which means that the
leader's prot in a duopoly is between the monopolistic prot and the follower's prot.
We presume the negative externalities and rst-mover advantage so as to focus on the
analysis of preemptive competition.
2.2 Preemptive equilibrium
This section explains preemptive equilibrium following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Huisman
(2001), and Grenadier (1996), among others. In a duopoly game, we need consider the
problem backwards. We denote the \Unlevered" case by the subscript U . Suppose that
the leader has invested at time s. The follower optimally enters the market by solving the
optimal stopping problem:
FU (X(s)) = sup
TFUs
EX(s)[
Z 1
TFU
e r(t s)(1  )QFX(t)dt  e r(TFU s)I]; (2)
where TFU runs over stopping times and EX(s)[] denotes the expectation conditional on
X(s). We denote the corporate tax rate by positive constant  . The value FU (X(s)) cor-
responds to the follower's option value at time s. Because of the strong Markov property
of X(t), problem (2) can be reduced to
sup
TFUs
EX(s)[e r(TFU s)

(1  )QF
r    X(TFU )  I

]
1For economic rationale of the assumption, refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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and has the explicit solution as follows:
FU (X(s)) =
8>>><>>>:

(1  )QFxFU
r      I

X(s)
xFU

(X(s) < xFU )
(1  )QF
r    X(s)  I (X(s)  x

FU );
(3)
where  := 1=2   =2 +p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2(> 1) is a positive characteristic root,
and xFU := (r   )I=f(   1)(1  )QF g is the entry trigger. The follower's entry time
is expressed as the optimal stopping time:
T FU := infft  s j X(t)  xFUg: (4)
Then, the leader's expected gain by investment at time s becomes
LU (X(s)) = EX(s)[
Z T FU
s
e r(t s)(1  )X(t)dt+
Z 1
T FU
e r(t s)(1  )QLX(t)dt]; (5)
where T FU is dened by (4). Note that after T

FU the leader's prot ows will decrease to
QLX(t). By straightforward calculation, we have
LU (X(s)) =
1  
r   X(s) 
(1  )(1 QL)xFU
r   

X(s)
xFU

; (6)
where  := 1=2  =2  p(=2   1=2)2 + 2r=2(< 0) is a negative characteristic root.
By comparing LU (X(s)) with FU (X(s)) we consider the situation in which neither rm
has invested. In the region FU (X(s)) < LU (X(s)), both rms are better o becoming
the rst mover, whereas in the region LU (X(s)) < FU (X(s)), both rms are better o
becoming the follower. In equilibrium, one of the rms, denoted by the leader, invests at
time
T LU := infft  0 j X(t)  xLUg: (7)
where xLU is the solution to FU (x

LU ) LU (xLU ) = 0.2 This investment is called preemp-
tive investment. The follower invests later on the best response timing T FU (> T

LU ). See
the top panel of Figure 1. Note that in equilibrium the rst-mover advantage is exactly
oset by ineciency in the preemptive entry. Firms are indierent between the roles of
the leader or the follower. Depending on the parameter values, there may exist joint
investment equilibrium in which both rms cooperate to invest at the same time which
is later than TLU . For example, see Huisman (2001) and Pawlina and Kort (2006). This
paper focuses only on preemptive equilibrium because the main objective is to examine
the levered case. Note that, in the levered case, no joint investment equilibrium arises.
2Because this is a model of symmetric rms, we cannot determine which one is exactly the rst mover. Based
on most of the literature including Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Grenadier (1996), we exclude the possibility
that both rms mistakenly invest at the same time xLU .
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3 Levered rms in a duopoly
3.1 Setup
Now, we proceed to examine how leverage aects preemptive competition. This section
explains how we can solve preemptive equilibrium in the levered case. In addition to the
setup in Section 2, we assume that both rms can issue console bonds on the investment
timing. This assumption is standard in the literature regarding dynamic investment and
capital structure (e.g., Sundaresan and Wang (2007a), Sundaresan and Wang (2007b),
Shibata and Nishihara (2012)). The levered rms are evaluated in the framework of
structural models by Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). In the frame-
work, after the issuance of debt, shareholders optimize the default timing to maximize the
equity value, whereas debtholders receive coupon payment until the default. The optimal
capital structure depends on the trade-o between costs associated with default and tax
benets from debt issuance. Throughout this paper, a rm determines its optimal capital
structure and investment timing to maximize its rm value.3 For simplicity, following
Lambrecht (2001) and Nishihara and Shibata (2010), we assume that a bankrupt rm
immediately leaves the market. The levered case greatly diers from the unlevered case
in the possibility of the market exit. The analysis in the levered case will better t pre-
emptive competition in technological development; actually, in IT industries, the majority
of venture businesses are forced to close after a boom.
3.2 Firms without a nancing constraint
As in Section 2.2, we consider the problem backwards. We begin by deriving the follower's
value in a duopoly. It depends on which rm exits the market rst. However, as will be
shown in numerical analysis, we always have the LIFO scenario, i.e., the follower leaves
the market before the leader. From now on, we will explain the methodology to derive
preemptive equilibrium in the LIFO scenario. For the state variable X(s), the equity,
debt, and rm values of the follower that has issued debt with coupon CF (> 0) are as
3We can say that shareholders maximize the ex-ante equity value under the assumption that debtholders are
competitive.
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follows:
EF (X(s); CF )
=EX(s)[
Z T dF
s
e r(t s)(1  )(QFX(t)  CF )dt]
=
(1  )QF
r    X(s) 
(1  )CF
r
 

(1  )QF
r    x
d
F  
(1  )CF
r

X(s)
xdF

(8)
DF (X(s); CF )
=EX(s)[
Z T dF
s
e r(t s)CFdt+ e r(T
d
F s)KF (xdF )]
=
CF
r
 

CF
r
 KF (xdF )

X(s)
xdF

(9)
VF (X(s); CF )
=EF (X(s); CF ) +DF (X(s); CF )
=
(1  )QF
r    X(s) +
CF
r
 

CF
r
+
(1  )QF
r    x
d
F  KF (xdF )

X(s)
xdF

; (10)
where T dF stands for the exit time and KF (x
d
F ) denotes the liquidation value. Because of
the smooth pasting condition, we have
T dF := infft  s j X(t)  xdF g; (11)
where the default trigger is dened by xdF := (r   )CF =f(   1)rQF g. Eq. (8){(10)
presume X(s)  xdF . This argument is the same as that of the structural model by
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001).
For preparation, we derive a coupon that maximizes the rm value (10). Follow-
ing Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) and Lambrecht (2001), we assume a linear form
KF (x
d
F ) := (1   F )(1   )QFxdF =(r   ) for the liquidation value, where a constant
F 2 (0; 1) measures costs associated with liquidation. By simple calculation, we have
the optimal coupon:
CF (X(s)) := argmax
CF
VF (X(s); CF ) =
r(   1)QF
(r   )h X(s); (12)
where h is a constant dened by
h =
h
1  

1  F + F

i  1

(> 1): (13)
By substituting (12) into (10), we obtain
VF (X(s); C

F (X(s))) =
(1  )QF
 (r   ) X(s); (14)
where  is a positive constant dened by
 =

1 +

(1  )h
 1
(< 1): (15)
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For details of derivation, refer to Sundaresan andWang (2007a) and Nishihara and Shibata
(2010).
Next, we consider a situation in which only the leader is active. We need solve the
leader's exit and follower's entry problems simultaneously. Denote the follower' entry
time by T F := infft  s j X(t)  xF g. Then, we have the follower's coupon CF (xF ) and
default trigger xdF = x

F =h. We denote the leader's default timing before and after the
follower's entry by T dbL and T
d
L, respectively. Under the LIFO scenario, we have
T dL := infft  s j X(t)  xdLg; (16)
where the default trigger xdL := (r   )CL=f(   1)rg(< xdF ) depends on the leader's
coupon payment CL(> 0). Denote by x
db
L the leader's default trigger before the follower's
entry. For the state variable X(s) 2 [xdbL ; xF ], the equity value of the leader that has
issued debt with coupon CL(> 0) is as follows:
EL(X(s); CL)
=EX(s)[
Z T dbL ^T F
s
e r(t s)(1  )(X(t)  CL)dt
+ 1fT F<T dbL g
(Z T dF
T F
e r(t s)(1  )(QLX(t)  CL)dt+
Z T dL
T dF
e r(t s)(1  )(X(t)  CL)dt
)
]
=
(1  )
r    X(s) 
(1  )CL
r
+ALX(s)
 +BLX(s)
 ; (17)
where ^ and 1fg stand for min(; ) and the indicator function, respectively. Coecients
AL and BL in (17) are constants satisfying two value matching conditions, i.e.,
(1  )
r    x
db
L  
(1  )CL
r
+ALx
db
L

+BLx
db
L

= 0 (18)
and
(1  )
r    x

F  
(1  )CL
r
+ALx

F
 +BLx

F

=
(1  )QL
r    x

F +
CL
r
+
(1  )(1 QL)
r    h
 1xF +
(1  )CL
r   

xF
xdL

: (19)
(18) means that the equity value becomes zero on the default timing, while (19) denotes
the equity value just after the follower's entry. In preparation for later, we calculate the
debt value
DL(X(s); CL)
=EX(s)[
Z T dbL ^T F
s
e r(t s)CLdt+ 1fT F<T dbL g
(Z T dL
T F
e r(t s)CLdt+ e r(T
d
L s)KL(xdL)
)
+ 1fT FT dbL ge
 r(T dbL  s)KbL(x
db
L )] (20)
=
CL
r
+ ~ALX(s)
 + ~BLX(s)
 ; (21)
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where KL(x
d
L) and K
b
L(x
db
L )
4 represent the liquidation value after the follower's exit and
before the follower's entry, respectively, while ~AL and ~BL are constants satisfying the
value matching conditions:
CL
r
+ ~ALx
db
L

+ ~BLx
db
L

= KbL(x
db
L ) (22)
and
CL
r
+ ~ALx

F
 + ~BLx

F
 =
CL
r
 

CL
r
 KL(xdL)

xF
xdL

: (23)
(22) means that the debt value equals the liquidation value on bankruptcy, while the
right-hand side of (23) corresponds to the debt value just after the follower's entry. The
rm value is expressed as VL(X(s); CL) := EL(X(s); CL) +DL(X(s); CL).
On the other hand, the follower's rm value before the entry is as follows:
F (X(s); CL)
=EX(s)[1fT F<T dbL ge
 r(T F s)fVF (xF ; CF (xF ))  Ig+ 1fT FT dbL ge
 r(T dbL  s)M(xdbL )]
=AFX(s)
 +BFX(s)
 ; (24)
where CL is the leader's coupon and M(x
db
L ) is the option value in a monopoly, i.e.,
M(xdbL ) := sup
TM
Ex
db
L [e rTM

1  
 (r   )X(TM )  I

] (25)
=

(1  )
 (r   )x

M   I

xdbL
xM

: (26)
Note that (25) results from the same argument as (14). We denote by xM :=  (r  
)I=f(   1)(1   )g and we presume that xdbL  xM . We also note that the follower's
option value F (X(s); CL) depends on the leader's coupon CL. Coecients AF and BF in
(24) are constants satisfying the following value matching conditions:
AFx
db
L

+BFx
db
L

=

(1  )
 (r   )x

M   I

xdbL
xM

(27)
and
AFx

F
 +BFx

F
 =
(1  )QF
 (r   ) x

F   I: (28)
(27) means that the rm value becomes the monopolist's option value if the leader leaves
the market before the follower's entry, while the right-hand side of (28) corresponds to
the follower's rm value in a duopoly minus investment costs.
Now, we like to determine triggers xdbL and x

F . Recall that the leader's exit trigger
xdbL is determined so as to maximize its equity value (17), whereas the follower's entry x

F
is determined so as to maximize its option value (24). Then, by the rst order optimality
conditions, we impose the smooth pasting conditions
1  
r    + ALx
db
L
 1
+ BLx
db
L
 1
= 0 (29)
4These liquidation values are not necessarily equivalent. One may assume non-linear forms for the functions,
although we will assume the linear functions in Section 4.
9
for (18) and
AFx

F
 1 + BFxF
 1 =
(1  )QF
 (r   ) (30)
for (28). (29) corresponds to the fact that shareholders of the leader optimize the exit
timing considering the follower's potential entry, while (30) corresponds to the fact that
shareholders maximize the option value on the entry timing considering the leader's po-
tential exit. For a xed CL, we can derive x
db
L ; x

F ; AL; BL; AF ; and BF by solving (18),
(19), (27), (28), (29), and (30) simultaneously. Technically, we do not have to solve these
six equations simultaneously. We easily obtain AL; BL; AF ; and BF as functions of x
db
L
and xF from (18), (19), (27), and (28). Then, we substitute them into (29) and (30) and
solve two equations with two variables xdbL and x

F . It is not dicult to numerically solve
the problem of two equations with two variables if one uses the optimization toolbox in
the Matlab.
Finally, we consider the situation in which neither rms has invested. The leader issues
debt to maximize the rm value, and hence, the leader's investment at time s leads to
debt with coupon
CL(X(s)) = arg max
CL0
VL(X(s); CL): (31)
The leader's expected gain is L(X(s)) := VL(X(s); C

L(X(s)))   I. In equilibrium, the
leader invests at time
T L := infft  0 j X(t)  xLg; (32)
where xL is the smallest solution to L(x

L)  F (xL; CL(xL)) = 0, along with issuing debt
with coupon CL(x

L). The follower's optimal response is described by the investment
trigger xF and coupon C

F (x

F ). The LIFO scenario presumes that C

F (x

F ) > C

L(x

L).
Based on Lambrecht (2001) and Murto (2004), a rm with lower coupon payment wins
the exit game and survives longer. The follower can deviate from the best policy under
the LIFO scenario and choose the rst in, rst out (FIFO) scenario by decreasing coupon
CF below C

L(x

L). However, in our numerical analysis, the deviation always decreases the
follower's value, and hence, we omit the FIFO scenario. If T F < T
db
L , the follower enters
the market at time T F and the duopoly goes on until T
d
F . The center panel of Figure
1 depicts a sample pass for this case. Otherwise, the leader exits the monopoly market
rst, and the follower takes the same strategy as that of the monopolist. In that case, the
duopoly is not realized. See the lower panel of Figure 1 for a sample pass in the case.
As a special case in which QF # 0, we obtain preemptive equilibrium in Nishihara
and Shibata (2010). In that case, we immediately have xF = 1; T F = 1; xdbL = xdL and
AL = ~AL = AF = 0. Suppose that K
b
L(x
db
L ) := (1 F )(1  )xdbL =(r  ) for the leader's
liquidation value. Similar to (12) and (14), we have CL(X(s)) = r( 1)X(s)=f(r )hg
and L(X(s)) = (1  )X(s)=f (r )g  I for the leader's value. For the follower's value
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we have
F (X(s); CL(X(s))) =EX(s)[e r(T
d
L s)M(xdL)]
=

(1  )
 (r   )x

M   I

xdL
xM
 
X(s)
xdL

=

(1  )
 (r   )x

M   I

X(s)
xM

h  (33)
where in (33) we used xdL = X(s)=h. In equilibrium, the leader invests as soon as
(1   )X(s)=f (r   )g   I equals (33). Because of T F = 1, the follower never en-
ters the market until the leader exits the market at time T dL. After the leader's exit, the
follower takes the monopolistic strategy. This equilibrium corresponds to Proposition 2
in Nishihara and Shibata (2010).
We also note that joint investment equilibrium never appears in the levered case.
Suppose that both rms enter a new market and issue debt at the same time. Each
rm always has an incentive to decrease its coupon payment just below the level of the
competitor's coupon because in this way it can survive and receive monopolistic prot
ows after the competitor's exit. Then, there is no equilibrium in which levered rms
invest at the same time. Next, suppose that both unlevered rms enter a new market
at the same time. In this case, each rm always has an incentive to optimize its capital
structure and increase its own value. In any case, there is no possibility that both rms
invest at the same time in equilibrium when they can adjust debt nancing.
3.3 Firms with nancing constraints
In Section 3.2, we assume that rms have sucient internal funds to cover investment
costs. In other words, debt issuance is merely a means for rms to optimize capital
structure. However, in some cases, debt issuance is a means for rms to fund invest-
ment projects. For instance, when one analyzes preemptive competition among venture
businesses in IT industries, the lack of internal funds places one of critical limitations on
investment behavior. This section supplements the previous analysis of optimal capital
structure by studying nancially constrained rms. In the nancially constrained case, we
simply assume that investment costs must be nanced by debt. Povel and Raith (2004)
consider similar constraints, although they analyze a static model based on Brander and
Lewis (1986).
Under the nancing constraints, the follower's optimal coupon needs to satisfy
DF (x

F ; C

F (x

F ))  I: (34)
According to our numerical analysis, (34) always holds because of the follower's high entry
trigger xF . Then, we explain how to compute equilibrium under the presumption of (34).
We do not need change the discussion from (12) to (30). However, the leader's optimal
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policy in the previous subsection does not necessarily satisfy the nancing constraint
DL(x

L; C

L(x

L))  I: (35)
This is because the leader's entry trigger xL is very low due to preemptive competition.
Note that debt value DL(x

L; C

L(x

L)) decrease as x

L is lower. While Povel and Raith
(2004) exogenously assume that one rm is nancially constrained and the other is un-
constrained, our model endogenously determines which rm is nancially constrained in
equilibrium. Indeed, in equilibrium, not the follower but the leader is nancially con-
strained whenever nancing constraints become binding.
We now turn to the case that (35) does not hold because equilibrium remains un-
changed from Section 3.2 under (35). In the case, we need modify derivation after (30).
We must solve
CLC(X(s)) = arg max
CL0
DL(X(s);CL)I
VL(X(s); CL) (36)
and calculate the nancially constrained leader's value LC(X(s)) := VL(X(s); C

LC(X(s))) 
I. Subscript C stands for the \Constrained" case. When the nancing constraints are
binding, the optimal coupon CLC(X(s)) satises DL(X(s); C

LC(X(s))) = I. In equilib-
rium, the leader invest at time
T LC := infft  0 j X(t)  xLCg; (37)
where xLC is the smallest solution to LC(x

LC)   F (xLC ; CLC(xLC)) = 0, along with
issuing debt with coupon CLC(x

LC). If T

F < T
db
L , the follower enters the market at time
T F and the duopoly goes on until T
d
F (cf. the center panel of Figure 1). Otherwise, the
leader leaves the market prior to the follower's entry (cf. the lower panel of Figure 1).
4 Numerical analysis and implications
4.1 Base case
This section numerically examines the properties of equilibrium in the precious section.
To do this, we need specify the leader's liquidation values, i.e., KL(x
d
L) after the follower's
exit and KbL(x
db
L ) before the follower's entry. For simplicity, similar to Goldstein, Ju,
and Leland (2001) and Lambrecht (2001), we assume the linear functions KL(x
d
L) :=
(1 L)(1 )xdL=(r ) and KbL(xdbL ) := (1 bL)(1 )xdbL =(r ). Although both values
are the liquidation values in a monopoly, we should reduce the latter by taking account of
the potential entry of the other rm. For simplicity, we assume that bL = L=QL. The
base parameter values are set as follows:
r = 0:08;  = 0:06;  = 0:2;  = 0:15; L = F = 0:3; QL = QF = 0:5: (38)
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The parameter values, except for QL and QF , are similar to Leland (2004) and Sarkar
(2008) based on empirical evidence. The investment costs I and initial value x = X(0) are
not substantial because they can be normalized. For expositional purpose, we set I = 10
and x = 0:2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The upper panel of Figure 2 presents LC(X(s)) and F (X(s); C

LC(X(s)) in the levered
case, whereas the lower panel presents LU (X(s)) and FU (X(s)) in the unlevered case. To
check whether nancing constraints are binding, the center panel shows the leader's debt
DL(X(s); C

LC(X(s)). DL(X(s); C

LC(X(s)) is equal to I(= 10) when X(s) is lower than
0:54. In this region, the nancing constraints bind the leader, and then the leader needs
adjust the debt issuance to meet the investment costs. Especially for X(s) <= 0:4,
the leader under the nancing constraints cannot nance the project because we have
maxCL DL(X(s); CL) < I. Thus, in the upper panel, we show the leader's and follower's
values only for the region X(s) > 0:4. In preemptive equilibrium, the leader's trigger xLC
is the smallest solution to LC(x

LC) F (xLC ; CLC(xLC)) = 0. The trigger is equal to 0:65,
for which the nancing constraints are not binding. Accordingly, we have xLC = x

L =
0:65, i.e., nancing constraints are not binding in the base case.
As noted in Section 3, we need check that the follower does not prefer the strategic
choice of the FIFO scenario. When the leader's strategy is xed, we compute the optimal
policy of the follower issuing debt with a coupon that is lower than CLC(x

LC) = 1:03. In
the FIFO scenario, the follower invests at the trigger 1:97 with issuing debt with coupon
just below 1:03. The follower also invests when X(t) decreases below 0:4, which is the
leader's exit trigger in duopoly under the assumption of the FIFO scenario. However,
the optimal policy in the FIFO scenario leads to the value 9:14, which is lower than
F (xLC ; C

LC(x

LC)) = 9:31 in the LIFO scenario, and then the follower has no incentive to
deviate from the LIFO scenario. Throughout our numerical analysis, the follower never
likes the FIFO scenario mainly because the leader's coupon payment CLC(x

LC) is low
due to the the early entry, whether nancial constraints bind the leader or not. Then, we
have the rst observation as follows.
Observation 1 In equilibrium, the LIFO scenario usually happens.
This result is consistent with ndings by Lambrecht (2001) and Zhdanov (2008). Lam-
brecht (2001) shows that the LIFO scenario prevails, except for the case in which the
leader has an extraordinary debt to repay. Zhdanov (2008) shows that the LIFO scenario
happens because the leader's preemptive entry makes its coupon payment lower than the
follower's. Observation 1 is also in line with the standard ndings that more established
rms with lower debt repayment are more likely to survive.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
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In equilibrium, we have Table 1. \Value" denotes the option value, which is evaluated
for an initial value x = 0:2. Note that the option value is the same for both rms because
in equilibrium the leader invests on the preemptive entry timing in which the rst-mover
advantage is oset by the follower's option value. The rm value in the levered case is
higher than that of the unlevered case. This is because both rms can optimize the capital
structure. We can see from \Entry" of Table 1 that the entry triggers for both levered
leader and follower are lower than those of the unlevered rms.
Observation 2 Compared to the unlevered case, levered rms' entry takes place earlier
and levered rms' values become higher.
Access to debt nancing increases rm value, and thus levered rms can invest earlier than
unlevered rms. The leverage eects are similar to that of the seminal work by Myers
(1977). The same results are seen in the real options studies, including Hennessy (2004),
Mauer and Sarkar (2005), and Sundaresan and Wang (2007a), based on the monopoly
setup. Observation 2 complements the existing literature by showing the robustness of
the leverage eects in the presence of preemptive competition.
In \Exit" for the leader of Table 1, we present two exit triggers xdL and x
db
L . We always
have xdL < x
db
L . This can be naturally explained by the leader who faces the follower's
potential entry as being more likely to exit compared to the case with no fear. If X(t)
hits 0:28 rst, then the leader leaves the market prior to the follower's entry. In this case,
the follower chooses the monopolist's entry trigger 1:13 and exit trigger 0:56. In the base
case, the probability that the leader exits before the follower's entry is approximately 30%
according the simulations.
\Leverage," \Credit spread," and \Coupon" of Table 1 show the values on the entry
timing. In other words, we presentDL(x

L; C

L(x

L))=VL(x

L; C

L(x

L)), C

L(x

L)=DL(x

L; C

L(x

L)) 
r, and CL(x

L) for the leader and C

F (x

F )=DF (x

F ; C

F (x

F )) r,DF (xF ; CF (xF ))=VF (xF ; CF (xF ))
and CF (x

F ) for the follower. As nancing constraints are not binding for either rm, the
leverage and credit spreads are optimal. The leader's values are slightly lower than the
follower's values, which are equal to the optimal levels in a monopoly. This is proba-
bly because the leader decreases the level of coupon payment taking into account the
follower's potential entry. This nding is consistent with that of Zhdanov (2008). It is
also consistent with MacKay and Phillips (2005) who empirically showed that the aver-
age leverage ratio of incumbents is lower than that of new entrants. Although Table 1
shows the leader's leverage on the leader's entry trigger 0:65, the leader's leverage on the
follower's entry trigger 2:27 is equal to 0:20, which is much smaller than the follower's
leverage 0:66. This is because the leader's coupon payment CLC(x

LC) = 1:03 is much
smaller than the follower's coupon payment 2:94. There are many empirical ndings that
highly levered rms suer from competitive disadvantage (e.g., Phillips (1995), Chevalier
(1995a), Chevalier (1995b)). Observation 1 is also in line with the ndings.
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4.2 Eects of rst-mover advantage
In this section, we examine the eects of rst-mover advantage from two aspects. First,
following Pawlina and Kort (2006), we consider the symmetric case, i.e., QL = QF , and
change the level of QL = QF . A decrease in the level of QL = QF denotes the prot
decrease in a duopoly, increasing the incentive for rms to move rst and monopolize
prot ows until the follower's entry. To examine preemptive equilibrium, we focus only
on the case of negative externalities, i.e., QL = QF < 1.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 ]
Figures 3 and 4 plot rm values, entry and exit triggers, leverage, and credit spread
for varying levels of QL = QF . The other parameter values are set at the base case (38).
Throughout the paper, except for rm values, the left panels represent the leader's values,
whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. In all gures, the triangle, cross,
and circle marks in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the
levered case without a constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively. When QL = QF
is lower than 0:4, nancing constraints become binding for the rst mover. For any
QL = QF , as noted in Section 3, the nancing constraints are not binding for the follower.
A prot decrease in a duopoly {in other words, an increase in competition in a duopoly{
forces the leader to suer from the constraints.
We can see from the top panel that a decrease in QL = QF decreases rm values
in any cases. This result is natural because the prot decrease in a duopoly damages
rm values. More interestingly, we nd that the decrease in rm values is mitigated by
nancing constraints. Indeed, for QF = QL = 0:2 and 0:3 in the top panel of Figure 3 ,
rm values in the constrained case are highest among three cases. If rms face no nancing
constraints, a decrease in QL = QF straightforwardly intensies preemptive competition
and greatly reduces rm values in equilibrium. However, the nancing constraints, which
increase the rst mover's leverage beyond the optimal level, decrease the leader's value
while they enhance the follower's value of the option to invest after the leader's exit.
This eect of high leverage of the leader on the potential entrant is the same as that of
Lambrecht (2001), although he exogenously assumes an incumbent with debt repayment.
Thus, the nancing constraints decrease rst-mover advantage and moderate preemptive
competition. Firm values with nancing constraints become higher than that with no
nancing constraints. A similar mechanism is explained in Nishihara and Shibata (2010),
although the previous model focuses only on the polar case (QF = 0). Especially for a low
level of QF = QL, the gap between rm values in the constrained and unconstrained cases
(nancing constraint eect) is larger than the gap between rm values in the unconstrained
and unlevered cases (leverage eect).
We turn to entry and exit triggers (see center and lower panels in Figure 3). A decrease
in QL = QF decreases the leader's entry trigger and increases the follower's entry trigger.
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The former is due to the intensied preemptive competition, while the latter is due to the
decreased prot of the follower. In the center panels of Figure 3, the entry triggers in the
levered case without a nancing constraint are always lower than those in the unlevered
case. As mentioned in Section 4.1, this is due to the leverage eect. However, with
nancing constraints, which weaken preemptive competition, the leader's entry trigger
can increase beyond the level of the unlevered case (see QL = QF = 0:2 in the center-left
panel). In this case, the nancing constraint eects overwhelm the leverage eects. For
QL = QF = 0:2 and 0:3 in the lower-left panel of Figure 3, we see that the default triggers
in the case with nancing constraints are higher than those without a nancing constraint.
This is because the nancing constraints impose higher leverage on the leader. On the
other hand, whether the leader suers from the nancing constraints little inuences the
follower's entry and exit triggers. Note that the follower's exit trigger always satises
xdF = x

F =h because of its optimal capital structure.
We now examine leverage and credit spreads (see Figure 4). We see from the right
panels that the follower's leverage and credit spreads do not depend on the level of QL =
QF . Because nancing constraints never bind the follower, the follower maintains the
optimal capital structure in which leverage is 0:66 and credit spread is 0:0047. On the
other hand, the leader's leverage and credit spread depend on the level of QL = QF .
Without a nancing constraint, a decrease in QL = QF slightly decreases the leverage
and credit spread. This is because the leader lowers the leverage and credit spread by
considering the potential decrease in prot ows in a duopoly. With nancing constraints
binding, a decrease in QL = QF adversely increases the leader's leverage and credit spread.
This means that a decrease in QL = QF forces the leader to take riskier capital structure.
The leader's leverage being higher than the follower's is not necessarily inconsistent with
MacKay and Phillips (2005). Indeed, if one sees the leader's leverage on the follower's
entry trigger, it remains around 0:2, which is much lower than the follower's leverage.
Next, we examine the other aspect of the rst-mover advantage. We x QL +QF = 1
and change the leader's share QL=(QL + QF ) in a duopoly. This measures the degree
of barriers to the follower's entry. For instance, customers accustomed to the leader's
product might prefer the leader's brand to the follower that has the same quality. This
sort of asymmetric case is also treated in Lambrecht (2001) and Kong and Kwok (2007).
[Insert Figures 5 and 6]
Figures 5 and 6 plot rm values, entry and exit triggers, leverage, and credit spreads
for varying levels of QL. The other parameter values are set at the base case (38).
Overall, we nd that an increase in QL in Figures 5 and 6 leads to the similar eects to
a decrease in QL = QF in Figures 3 and 4. The eects are much stronger because the
level of QL=(QL +QF ) changes the rst-mover advantage more directly than the level of
QL = QF . Indeed, nancing constraints become binding when QL is larger than 0:55. As
mentioned, the nancing constraints can play a positive role in moderating preemptive
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competition and increasing the rm value. See the top panel of Figure 5. Especially
for QL = 0:7; 0:8; and 0:9, the value enhanced by the nancing constraints are greater
than the value enhanced by the leverage eects. An increase in QL, which increases the
rst-mover advantage, decreases the leader's entry trigger, but the decrease is mitigated
by the nancing constraints. The leader's entry trigger can be either higher or lower than
that of the unlevered case depending on the trade-o between the nancing constraint
and leverage eects. Although the nancing constraints increase rm values, they make
the leader's investment riskier in terms of the leverage and credit spread.
Finally, we summarize interesting ndings as follows:
Observation 3 Financing constraints can delay the leader's preemptive entry and im-
prove rm values. When the nancing constraint eects dominate the leverage eects, the
leader's entry trigger can be higher than that of the unlevered case.
The eect of nancing constraints on the investment trigger is similar to the standard
result that nancially constrained rms invest less than unconstrained rms (e.g., Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hubbard (1998)). Although Nishihara and Shibata (2010)
point out the possibility that nancing constraints can soften preemptive competition and
improve rm values, we extend the previous setup (QF = 0) into a more general setup
(QF > 0) and show that the positive eect can arise in such a general case. Indeed,
we nd that, with slight rst-mover advantage, nancing constraints can be binding and
play a positive role. Thus, the empirical implications from this paper are not limited to
extremely intensied competition but also apply to a wide range of market competition.
Observation 4 Stronger rst-mover advantage speeds up the leader's preemptive entry
and reduces rm values. This rst-mover advantage eect can be greatly mitigated by the
nancing constraint eects that increase with stronger rst-mover advantage.
The rst sentence is in line with the standard result in preemptive competition (e.g., Huis-
man (2001), Pawlina and Kort (2006)). The interactions between nancing constraints
and rst-mover advantage generate another empirical prediction. There are a number of
papers that study the relation between leverage and product market competition, though
few papers consider preemptive competition. The majority of research in this area shows
empirical evidence that more leverage can lead to weaker product market competition
(e.g., Phillips (1995), Chevalier (1995a), Chevalier (1995b)). These ndings support our
results of the nancing constraint eects. Indeed, in our paper, nancing constraints
increase the leader's leverage and soften preemptive competition, Lambrecht (2001) also
shows that high leverage of an incumbent moderates competition, but the paper does not
analyze preemptive equilibrium. We complement the previous research by showing that
similar results hold in preemptive equilibrium.
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4.3 Eects of volatility 
In this section, we analyze comparative statics with respect to the other key parameter
. As our model includes strategic interactions, leverage, and nancing constraints, we
like to focus on how the market volatility inuences those factors.
[Insert Figures 7 and 8]
Figures 7 and 8 plot rm values, entry and exit triggers, leverage, and credit spreads for
varying levels of . The other parameter values are set at the base case (38). In all panels,
we see that the dot marks overlap the cross marks. Actually, nancing constraints are
not binding for any .
We see from the top panel of Figure 7 that the rm value increases with  in both
levered and unlevered cases. In the center (lower) panels, we also see that the entry (exit)
triggers increase (decrease) with  in all cases. The standard real option theory argues
that higher uncertainty increases a rm's option value and delays the exercise of its option.
Our results regarding entry and exit triggers are in line with the standard theory. Most of
the papers including Pawlina and Kort (2006) and Nishihara and Shibata (2010) show the
same result in preemptive equilibrium. We conclude that the standard results are robust
even if preemptive competition and leverage are taken into account.
In the center panels of Figure 7, we nd another interesting property. The dierence
between the follower's entry triggers in the levered and unlevered cases clearly decreases
with , although the dierence in the leader's entry triggers scarcely changes. Since
a higher  increases the option value of waiting for the leader's exit, the follower has
more incentive to delay the entry. For  = 0:4, this eect becomes almost as strong as
the leverage eect, and hence the dierence in the levered and unlevered cases becomes
nearly zero.
Figure 8 depicts the leverage and credit spreads on the entry timing. In all panels, we
nd that the leverage monotonically decreases with  while the credit spread monotoni-
cally increases with . Because debt becomes riskier under high uncertainty, rms reduce
debt issuance. These results are consistent with the standard results in the absence of
strategic interactions (e.g., Leland (1994), Sundaresan and Wang (2007a)) as well as being
consistent with empirical ndings (e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1983)).
Now, we explore the eects of  on nancing constraints. To do this, we replace
QL = QF = 0:5 with QL = QF = 0:4 in (38).
[Insert Figures 9 and 10]
Figures 9 and 10 show rm values, entry and exit triggers, leverage, and credit spreads for
varying levels of . We see that nancing constraints become binding when  increases
beyond 0:2. A higher  intensies the nancing constraint eects. This result is similar
to that of Nishihara and Shibata (2010). The intuition is as follows. For a higher , the
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optimal leverage (see the upper-left panel of Figure 10) becomes lower and so does the
debt issuance. When  exceeds a threshold level (in this example, 0:2), the debt value
under the optimal capital structure falls short of the investment costs. Then, the nancing
constraints become binding under higher uncertainty about the market demand.
Observation 5 A higher volatility delays rms' entry and improve rm values. This
volatility eect can be slightly magnied by the nancing constraint eects that increase
with a higher volatility.
Although a higher  increases rm values and entry triggers in all cases, the nancing
constraint eects amplify the volatility eect for levered rms with nancing constraints.
Recall that, as explained in Section 4.2, nancing constraints alleviate preemptive com-
petition, thus increasing the leader's entry trigger and rm values. In Figures 9 and 10,
the nancing constraint eects are not very large compared to Figures 3{6. Indeed, for
 = 0:25; 0:3; 0:35, and 0:4, the rm value enhanced by the nancing constraints are much
smaller than the value enhanced by the leverage eects (see the top panel of Figure 9).
We conclude that the nancing constraint eects can be caused by a higher  but they
are relatively small.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we shed light on how rms' nancial structure inuences preemptive com-
petition. We found the LIFO scenario, i.e., the follower exits the duopoly market prior to
the leader. This is primarily because, due to the entry lag, the follower issues much more
debt than the leader. We also showed that the well-known leverage eects remain true in
preemptive equilibrium. Actually, access to debt nancing increases rm values and accel-
erates investment. This paper examined not only the case with optimal capital structure
but also the case with nancing constraints that require rms to nance investment costs
by debt. Notably, we showed that the nancing constraints can delay preemptive invest-
ment and improve rm values in equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's leverage increased by
the nancing constraints could lower rst-mover advantage and mitigate preemptive com-
petition. The nancing constraint eects increase in a market with stronger rst-mover
advantage and higher volatility. Especially in the presence of relatively strong rst-mover
advantage, the nancing constraint eects can potentially dominate the leverage eects
and then preemptive investment occurs later than that in the unlevered case. Our ndings
are in line with empirical evidence that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage
and mitigates product market competition.
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Table 1: Base case.
Value Entry Exit Leverage Credit spread Coupon
Levered case 2:18
Leader 0:65 0:20=0:28 0:63 0:0039 1:03
Follower 2:27 1:12 0:66 0:0047 2:94
Unlevered case 1:90
Leader 0:77
Follower 2:46
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Figure 1: Simulation. We simulated X(s) with the base parameter values (38) in Section 4. The
top panel shows the leader and follower's entry triggers in the unlevered case. The center panel
corresponds to the case in which the duopoly is realized, while the lower panel corresponds to
the case in which the leader exits the market before the follower's entry.
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Figure 2: The base case. The top and bottom panels represent the leader and follower's values
in the levered case with nancing constraints and the unlevered case, respectively. The center
panel show the leader's debt value DL(X(s); C

LC(X(s)).
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Figure 3: Option values, entry triggers, and exit triggers with varying levels of QL = QF . The
other parameter values are set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's
values, whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle
marks in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without
a constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively. In the lower-left panel, triangle (down-
pointing triangle) and cross (square) marks represent the leader's exit triggers after (before)
the follower's entry in the constrained and unconstrained cases, respectively.
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Figure 4: Leverage and credit spreads with varying levels of QL = QF . The other parameter
values are set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's values, whereas the
right panels represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle marks in the panels
denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without a constraint, and
the unlevered case, respectively.
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Figure 5: Option values, entry triggers, and exit triggers with varying levels of QL. The
other parameter values are set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's
values, whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle
marks in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without
a constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively. In the lower-left panel, triangle (down-
pointing triangle) and cross (square) marks represent the leader's exit triggers after (before)
the follower's entry in the constrained and unconstrained cases, respectively.
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Figure 6: Leverage and credit spreads with varying levels of QL. The other parameter values are
set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's values, whereas the right panels
represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle marks in the panels denote the
levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without a constraint, and the unlevered
case, respectively.
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Figure 7: Option values, entry triggers, and exit triggers with varying levels of . The other
parameter values are set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's values,
whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle marks
in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without a
constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively. In the lower-left panel, triangle (down-pointing
triangle) and cross (square) marks represent the leader's exit triggers after (before) the follower's
entry in the constrained and unconstrained cases, respectively.
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Figure 8: Leverage and credit spreads with varying levels of . The other parameter values are
set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's values, whereas the right panels
represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle marks in the panels denote the
levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without a constraint, and the unlevered
case, respectively.
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Figure 9: Option values, entry triggers, and exit triggers with varying levels of . We set
QL = QF = 0:4. The other parameter values are set at the base case (38). The left panels
represent the leader's values, whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. The
triangle, cross, and circle marks in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints,
the levered case without a constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively. In the lower-
left panel, triangle (down-pointing triangle) and cross (square) marks represent the leader's
exit triggers after (before) the follower's entry in the constrained and unconstrained cases,
respectively.
31
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
σ
Le
ve
ra
ge
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
σ
Le
ve
ra
ge
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
σ
Sp
re
ad
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
σ
Sp
re
ad
Figure 10: Leverage and credit spreads with varying levels of . We set QL = QF = 0:4. The
other parameter values are set at the base case (38). The left panels represent the leader's
values, whereas the right panels represent the follower's values. The triangle, cross, and circle
marks in the panels denote the levered case with nancing constraints, the levered case without
a constraint, and the unlevered case, respectively.
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